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HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY:
EXPRESSIVE HARM AND THE
STAKES OF “MARRIAGE”
CORINNE BLALOCK
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of political struggle, same-sex marriage advocates
initially celebrated when the Court granted a writ of certiorari in not
one but two cases related to same-sex marriage this term: United
1
2
States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. It was all but a foregone
conclusion that the United States Supreme Court would review the
Defense of Marriage Act; the grant in Perry, however, took many by
3
surprise. Realization that the two cases cut against one another on
4
important issues tempered the initial excitement. Following oral
arguments, many began to speculate that the grant of certiorari in
Perry may have come from the conservative Justices on the Court,
5
hoping to use it to limit or counterbalance their holding in Windsor.
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1. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. argued Mar. 27, 2013).
2. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. argued Mar. 26, 2013).
3. Adam Liptak, Who Wanted to Take the Case on Gay Marriage? Ask Scalia, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, at A1.
4. Most strikingly, federalism considerations bolster opposite positions in the two cases.
In Windsor, the federalism arguments cut in favor of same-sex marriage: The federal
government should defer to the states’ inclusion of same-sex couples within the definition of
marriage because “Congress’s establishment of a competing federal definition of family
undermines the States’ sovereign authority to define, regulate, and support family
relationships.” Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor
at 4, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2013). In Perry, the federalism
argument cuts against same-sex marriage, characterizing Proposition 8’s exclusion of same-sex
couples from the definition of marriage as a permissible exercise of state sovereignty in an area
traditionally reserved for the states. See generally Brief of Thirty-Seven Scholars of Federalism
and Judicial Restraint as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12144 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2013) (arguing that the Court should uphold Proposition 8 on federalism
grounds).
5. See, e.g., Nan Hunter, Why Today’s Argument Could Decide the Gay Marriage Debate,
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The specific legal issue in Perry is whether California’s revocation
of the label but not the substantive rights of “marriage” from samesex couples violates the Equal Protection Clause or Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The California law is unique in
two important respects: 1) California is the only state to rescind the
6
right of same-sex marriage through constitutional amendment, and 2)
through California’s domestic partnership laws, same-sex couples
7
already have access to all the substantive rights of marriage. At its
core, therefore, Perry is about the value of a word and the power of
government speech to convey normative judgments; simply put, it is a
case about expressive harm.
The isolation of the label “marriage” from the substantive benefits
of marriage makes Perry divisive even among gay rights supporters.
For instance, the LGBT community is largely united on the issue of
substantive legal rights, but deeply divided over whether the
normative goal of state-recognition through a label should be the
primary political objective, or whether political energy would be
better spent challenging such normative institutions and addressing
8
persistent material inequalities. Expressive harm is also theoretically
divisive. Constitutional scholars disagree about whether expressive
harm is cognizable as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or
whether it is too subjective and open-ended to be recognized as a
9
state-imposed harm.
THE NATION (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/173586/real-argument-today-andluck-perry-case-could-go-away (hypothesizing that the conservative Justices supported the grant
based on an assumption that Justice Kennedy would not want to accept the Respondents’
framing); Liptak, supra note 3, at A1 (speculating that the conservative Justices on the Court
were behind the decision to hear the case out of recognition that their chances of limiting samesex marriage would only lessen with time).
6. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (highlighting the
exceptional nature of California’s withdrawal of the right).
7. Id. at 1069.
8. See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 244 (2006) (discussing the division within the LGBT community about
whether state recognition should really be the goal or whether the LGBT community should be
focusing on the “creative possibilities that the middle ground between criminalization and
assimilation might have offered up”); see also Lisa Duggan, Beyond Marriage: Democracy,
Equality, and Kinship for a New Century, S&F ONLINE, ISSUE 10.2 (2012),
http://sfonline.barnard.edu/a-new-queer-agenda/beyond-marriage-democracy-equality-andkinship-for-a-new-century/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (arguing that same-sex marriage has
become the focal point of the LGBT movement at the expense of other important causes that
address material inequalities and discussing the conservative legacy of pro-marriage initiatives
as a form of privatization of responsibility since the Reagan era).
9. While some constitutional law scholars advocate recognition of expressive harm in
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Despite these internal divisions, expressive harm still offers a
reasonable grounding for the Court’s holding in Perry. The Court has
never before held that an expressive harm alone can violate equal
10
protection, and therefore upholding the lower court’s decision could
appear as a radical break in jurisprudence. However, when viewed
11
through the lens of “animus analysis,” affirming the Ninth Circuit’s
holding and striking down Proposition 8 appears wholly
commensurate with the Court’s recent jurisprudence.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2009, after being denied marriage licenses by the State of
California, two same-sex couples, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, and
Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, teamed up with legal heavyweights
Theodore Olsen and David Boies to file a suit alleging Proposition
8—the 2008 California constitutional amendment that had withdrawn
the right to marry from same-sex couples—violated the Fourteenth
12
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

equal protection, others argue that such an approach makes the Equal Protection Clause too
open-ended and subjective, and that the Constitution is not intended to protect people’s
feelings. See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1284 (2011) (characterizing the dominant mode of thinking that
the only constitutionally cognizable harm is material harm as the “sticks-and-stones” baseline
assumption). Critics of expressive harm theories cite First Amendment concerns that the
government must be able to speak freely: “Being incidentally insulted or otherwise harmed by
government speech . . . might [be] . . . part of the price each of us potentially pays for having an
effective government, much in the same way that being harmed by private speech is part of the
price we pay for the First Amendment.” Id. at 1285. And finally, critics of expressive harm
approaches argue that there is no proof that discriminatory government expression leads to
actual status harm for the group the government’s expression supposedly stigmatizes: “Stigma is
not even sufficient, let alone necessary, for status harm.” Matthew D. Adler, Expressive
Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1436 (2000).
10. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971) (“[N]o case in this Court has
held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the
men who voted for it.”).
11. “Animus analysis” constitutes a distinct line of equal protection jurisprudence—
separate from the tiers of scrutiny framework—that prohibits under rational basis review
legislation enacted with no legitimate purpose other than a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group. See infra notes 50–59. For a more complete analysis of this strain of equal
protection jurisprudence, see generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012).
12. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1069.
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A. The Enactment and Repeal of Proposition 22
The narrative of Perry, however, begins well before Proposition
8’s passage. The story begins in March of 2000 when California voters
passed Proposition 22, which amended the California Family Code to
limit “valid and recognized” marriages in the state of California to
13
those between a man and a woman. In response, multiple cases were
filed in California state courts arguing Proposition 22 violated the
California Constitution.
In 2008, these cases were heard collectively as the In re Marriage
14
Cases. The California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 22 as
unconstitutional under both the due process clause and the equal
15
protection clause of California’s Constitution. The court also held
that the State had to issue marriage licenses without regard to the
16
gender of the applicant’s intended spouse. In the wake of the
holding, California counties issued more than 18,000 marriage licenses
17
to gay and lesbian couples.
B. Proposition 8
In response to the court’s holding, five residents of California,
currently Petitioners in Perry, began collecting voter signatures and
filed petitions to place Proposition 8—an initiative to amend the State
Constitution to limit recognition of marriage to that between a man
18
and a woman—on the November 4, 2008 ballot. Following a forty
million dollar campaign, 52.3% of California voters voted in favor of
19
Proposition 8. Its passage withdrew from same-sex couples access to
the legal title of “marriage,” but not to the substantive benefits of
marriage, which remained in tact through California’s domestic
20
partnership laws.
In early 2009, after being denied marriage licenses as a result of
Proposition 8’s passage, Respondents filed suit alleging that
Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
21
States Constitution. The district court invalidated Proposition 8
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1065 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5).
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 453.
Perry, 671 F.3d at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1068.
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22

applying strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause, but also held
the law could not withstand even rational basis review under the
23
Equal Protection Clause. In the face of this decision, the State
24
refused to appeal the case to the Ninth Circuit.
C. The State’s Refusal and the Proponents’ Intervention
The five California residents who had led the campaign to get
Proposition 8 on the ballot petitioned the Ninth Circuit to allow them
to intervene and appeal the district court decision in light of the
25
State’s refusal to defend the measure’s validity. The Ninth Circuit
certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether,
under California law, the proponents of Proposition 8 had Article III
standing either 1) on behalf of their own particularized interest in
upholding Proposition 8 (third party standing), or 2) on behalf of the
26
State’s interest (delegated Article III standing). The California
Supreme Court held that “the official proponents of the initiative
[were] authorized under California law to appear and assert the
27
[S]tate’s interest in the initiative’s validity.” In so holding, the
California Supreme Court declined to address whether proponents
28
met the requirements of third party standing under Article III.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issues facing the Court in Perry are standing, the standard of
review, equal protection and substantive due process. Regarding
standing, the Court will address whether the proponents of a ballot
initiative can represent the State’s interests in defending that initiative
under Article III of the United States Constitution. The other issues—
standard of review, equal protection, and substantive due process—
22. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 706 F. Supp. 921, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (holding that no compelling state interest justifies denying
same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry).
23. Id. (holding there was no rational basis for limiting the designation of “marriage” to
opposite-sex couples and excluding same-sex couples as a class).
24. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1068.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1074 (asking whether “the official proponents of an initiative measure possess
either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the State’s
interest in the initiative’s validity”).
27. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). This holding only
addresses the delegation of standing as a matter of state law; this question as a matter of federal
law remains open.
28. Id. at 1011.
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overlap. Although the Court has never announced a heightened
standard of review for statutes that classify individuals based on
sexual orientation, recent cases addressing their treatment under the
law appear to apply a heightened form of rational basis review under
29
both equal protection and substantive due process analysis. The
equal protection analysis addresses whether gays and lesbians
constitute a class that by definition warrants the greater protection
that comes with heightened scrutiny. The substantive due process
analysis is an alternative basis for heightened scrutiny in this case,
through Proposition 8’s restriction of either the fundamental right to
marry or the dignity interest in allowing people to choose their own
intimate life partner.
A. The Standing Issue
As certified by the California Supreme Court, the State’s interest
in upholding Proposition 8 has been properly delegated to the
proponents under state law. However, it is unclear whether this
delegation of authority is sufficient under federal law for Article III
standing. None of the cases the United States Supreme Court has
decided regarding delegation of a State’s Article III standing is
without ambiguity, nor is there a case precisely on point. The two most
30
closely related are Karcher v. May and Arizonans for Official English
31
v. Arizona.
Karcher addressed the ability of a State to delegate its Article III
standing to state representatives. There, two members of the New
Jersey state legislature intervened at the district court level to defend
32
a statute that the Governor refused to defend. After the district
court struck down the statute, but before the case was appealed, both
33
members lost their seats in the legislature. The Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed that they had standing in their official capacitites
to defend the statute on behalf of the State; Justice O’Connor cited no
34
textual basis for this decision. The Court, however, denied the now
29. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (holding that moral disapproval
of sodomy was not a rational basis for the State to discriminate against homosexuals); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment’s imposition of a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single group lacked any rational relation to legitimate
state interests).
30. 484 U.S. 72 (1987).
31. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
32. Karcher, 484 U.S. at 75.
33. Id. at 77–78.
34. Id. at 82. Instead, the Court appears to base its holding on the fact that the New Jersey
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ex-legislators’ standing to appeal because the capacity for standing
35
was retained by the positions held, not by the individuals.
In Arizonans for Official English, the Court addressed whether,
without an explicit delegation of state interest, proponents of an
initiative had standing to defend it under Article III. The Court
expressed “grave doubts” that the proponents of a ballot initiative
would have Article III standing to defend the State’s interest absent
36
some express state law granting authority. Citing Karcher, the Court
rejected the ballot proponents’ contention that they had a “quasi37
legislative interest” grounded in the nature of the initiative process.
However, because the case was held to be moot on other grounds, the
38
Court did not fully resolve the issue of the proponents’ standing.
B. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims
The Court has not clarified the level of scrutiny for statutes that
39
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. One source of
ambiguity is the degree to which the cases addressing discrimination
based on sexual orientation blur the line between equal protection
and substantive due process analysis. Although it appears there is
some level of heightened scrutiny applied, it is unclear whether such
heightened review is grounded in equal protection or substantive due
process analysis. The Court’s application of “animus” analysis in
40
Romer v. Evans complicates the standard of review question even
further.
1. Substantive Due Process and Fundamental Rights
Under the Due Process Clause, legislation that burdens the
41
exercise of a “fundamental right” is subject to strict scrutiny. The
42
Court has repeatedly recognized marriage as a fundamental right.
Supreme Court granted the legislators’ petition to intervene.
35. Id. at 81.
36. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 66.
37. Id. at 44–45.
38. Id. at 66–67.
39. The Court directly addressed the discriminatory treatment of gays and lesbians in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), but neither
opinion declared a standard of review for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.
40. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
41. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
42. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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43

Loving v. Virginia is the most relevant precedent because it
addresses the ability of a state to exclude couples from the institution
44
of marriage.
In Loving, a 1967 decision, the Court held that Virginia’s antimiscegenation law violated both the Due Process Clause and the
45
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief
Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that there
could be no justification for the statute other than the maintenance of
46
white supremacy. Even though marriage had traditionally been
considered the exclusive province of the States, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state sources of “invidious
47
racial discrimination.”
2. Equal Protection: Tiers of Review and “Animus Analysis”
Equal Protection analysis employs a highly deferential standard
(rational basis review) unless the law discriminates on the basis of a
48
“suspect classification.” If a law discriminates on the basis of a
suspect classification (or against a “suspect class”) it is subject to
49
heightened scrutiny. The Court, however, has not recognized gays
and lesbians as a “suspect class.”
“Animus analysis” comprises a distinct line of equal protection
cases, outside the traditional tiered framework. This line of cases can
50
be traced back to United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
which famously held that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group” could not constitute a legitimate state interest and
51
could not withstand even rational basis review. In each case, the
43. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
44. See id. at 12 (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry[] a person
of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 11.
47. Id.
48. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973) (“Under ‘traditional’ equal
protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained unless it is ‘patently arbitrary’
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”).
49. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (legitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (race). In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, the Court held that unlike race, alienage, and legitimacy, which require strict scrutiny,
classifications based on gender (a quasi-suspect class) need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
See 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (“[A] party seeking to uphold the statute that classifies individuals
on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive
justification’ for the classification.” (citation omitted)).
50. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
51. Id. at 534.
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Court struck down a law affecting a politically unpopular (but not
52
“suspect” or even “quasi-suspect”) group, such as hippies or the
53
mentally disabled, under rational basis review (not an explicitly
higher standard). The Court in Romer employed the “animus
analysis” framework with regard to gays and lesbians.
In 1992, in response to the passage of several local statutes
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
54
Colorado amended its state constitution to prohibit such protections.
Amendment 2 withdrew from homosexuals, but no other group, legal
55
protections prohibiting discrimination. In Romer, the Court declared
the Amendment to be “at once too narrow and too broad[,]” insofar
as it “identifie[d] persons by a single trait and then denie[d] them
56
protection across the board.” Because the possible justifications for
Amendment 2 failed to overcome the “inference of animus”
established by the deprivation of rights from a politically unpopular
group, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that the
amendment “classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper
57
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.” The
opinion explicitly affirmed the reasoning in Moreno that “[equal
protection of the laws] must at the very least mean that a bare . . .
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
58
legitimate governmental interest.” Eliding a direct statement of the
59
standard of review, the Court struck down Amendment 2.
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent in Romer, arguing that the
60
majority had “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite” and that it
was insulting for the Court to “disparag[e] as bigotry adherence to
61
traditional attitudes.” In addition, he asserted that gays and lesbians
do not constitute a politically disadvantaged class, but in fact “possess
52. See id. (striking down an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 that was intended
to exclude hippies from the program).
53. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating
legislation that sought to exclude the mentally disabled from the city through zoning regulations
as motivated by “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded”).
54. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996).
55. Id. at 627.
56. Id. at 647.
57. Id. at 635.
58. Id. at 634–35 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
59. Id. The Court avoided a direct statement of the standard of review largely due to the
conclusion that the bare desire to harm is never a legitimate state interest under “animus
analysis.”
60. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 652.
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62

3. Blurring the Line Between Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection
63
Less than ten years ago, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
overruled a relatively recent precedent when it struck down a Texas
sodomy law as a violation of the liberty interest inherent in the Due
64
Process Clause. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, blurred the
line between equal protection and substantive due process analysis:
“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
65
advances both interests.” The Court appeared to employ a form of
heighted rational basis review. However, neither the standard nor its
grounding was made explicit.
The Lawrence opinion ruled out morality as a legitimate ground
66
for discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Justice Kennedy
characterized the liberty to choose one’s intimate partner as a dignity
interest, stating that the Constitution demands the law respect the
individual’s autonomy in making these decisions, and that to do
67
otherwise “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.” Although the
majority in Lawrence declined to rely on the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice O’Connor embraced it as grounds for striking down the Texas
statute in her concurrence, arguing that animus analysis should be
68
applied.
Recent case law thus gives the Court four distinct options for
applying heightened scrutiny: 1) The Court could view this case as a
straight violation of the fundamental right to marry (Loving); 2) the
Court could apply a heightened form of rational basis review under
equal protection analysis (Romer); 3) the Court could muddle
62. Id. at 646.
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64. Id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which only seventeen
years earlier upheld a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing consensual homosexual sex).
65. Id. at 575.
66. Id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a [s]tate has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.” (citation omitted)).
67. Id. at 574–75.
68. Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that when the law exhibits the
desire to harm a politically unpopular group the Court has used “a more searching form of
rational basis review” under the Equal Protection Clause).
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through both equal protection and substantive due process as they
relate to sexual orientation (Lawrence); or 4) the Court could ground
its reasoning in “animus analysis,” as the Ninth Circuit did below.
IV. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, but did so on narrower grounds
than the lower court. The district court held Proposition 8
unconstitutional under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal
69
Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, considered “the
narrowest ground for adjudicating the constitutional questions”:
whether “Proposition 8 singles out same-sex couples for unequal
70
treatment by taking away from them alone the right to marry.”
Prior to reaching the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Petitioners’ standing. Citing Karcher, the Ninth Circuit stated that
“[p]rinciples of federalism require that federal courts respect such
71
decisions by the states as to who may speak for them,” and
Petitioners’ standing was therefore necessarily a question of state law.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit abided by the California Supreme
72
Court’s decision and recognized Petitioners’ standing.
Moving to the merits, the Ninth Circuit considered the case as a
matter under the Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit’s equal
protection analysis was grounded largely in Romer. The court
rehearsed the similarities between Proposition 8 and Amendment 2:
1) Both created a carve-out exception in the equal protection clause
of their respective state constitutions; 2) both singled out one class of
people for disfavored status; and 3) neither involved stripping a
73
constitutionally protected right. The court also acknowledged the
significant difference in the breadth of the two amendments—
69. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1076 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (noting that the district
court held Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause for
depriving same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry and for excluding only same-sex
couples from state-sponsored marriage, respectively).
70. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s inquiry was circumscribed by the logic of Romer. In Romer,
there was no doubt that Colorado did not have to extend anti-discrimination protection to gays
and lesbians, rather the relevant legal question was whether the subsequent removal of that
protection could be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1088 (citing Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
71. Id. at 1071.
72. Id. at 1072.
73. Id. at 1081–82.
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Proposition 8 discriminated with “surgical precision” instead of
74
“sweeping effect.” The court found that this surgical precision made
Proposition 8 even more suspect because it made it less likely that its
75
passage furthered the State’s interest. Like in Romer, because
Proposition 8 rescinded a right from a politically unpopular group,
Petitioners had the burden of overcoming an inference of animus. The
court held that none of the interests purportedly furthered by
Proposition 8 were rationally related to the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the institution of marriage, and thus Petitioners failed to
76
overcome the inference of animus.
The court concluded that by stripping same-sex couples of the
label “marriage,” “Proposition 8 left the incidents [of marriage] but
77
took away the status and the dignity.” Undergirding this analysis was
the contention that “[t]he action of changing something suggests a
78
more deliberate purpose than does the inaction of leaving it as it is.”
Framing the issue in terms of the removal of a right necessarily
limited the holding to California, because California is the only state
that has granted and then withdrawn the right to same-sex marriage.
The court held that “[b]y using their initiative power to target a
minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a
legitimate reason for doing so, the People of California violated the
79
Equal Protection Clause.” The court never reached the broader
question of whether denial—as opposed to withdrawal—of the right
to “marriage” violates either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners advance six substantive arguments: 1) Petitioners meet
the requirements for Article III standing; 2) the Court should apply
rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny; 3) the Ninth Circuit, by
focusing on the withdrawal of a right, misinterpreted Romer; 4)
Proposition 8 furthers the State’s interest in responsible procreation;
5) Proposition 8 is rationally related to the need to proceed with
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1081.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1096.
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caution before creating unforeseen social consequences; and 6)
upholding Proposition 8 furthers California’s interest in democratic
self-governance.
Petitioners begin by affirming their Article III standing to defend
80
Proposition 8. They argue that, in accordance with both the
principles of federalism and of precedent, state law should determine
who is able to assert the State’s interest. They distinguish Arizonans
for Official English, because here California state law clearly grants
81
them standing, as certified by the California Supreme Court.
They next argue the standard of review should be rational basis
review. Although Petitioners claim Proposition 8 could withstand any
level of scrutiny—even strict scrutiny—they assert that heightened
scrutiny would be inappropriate. Proposition 8 distinguishes oppositesex from same-sex couples because biologically they are differently
82
situated with regard to procreation. Equal protection only requires
that the law treat similarly-situated persons alike; it allows the law to
83
treat differently-situated people differently. Therefore, they argue,
same-sex couples are treated differently with regards to marriage not
out of animus but because they are differently-situated with regard to
84
the state interest in childrearing.
Petitioners refute the logic of the Ninth Circuit opinion as a
misinterpretation of Romer. They argue the Ninth Circuit’s reading of
Romer as emphasizing the inability to withdraw a right is
fundamentally misguided because the Court “struck down
Amendment 2 on its face,” not based on the few jurisdictions that had
85
granted special protections to gays and lesbians prior to its passage.
A State is not required to maintain policies that exceed federal
86
constitutional requirements. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s focus
on the withdrawal of a right allows an important constitutional
question to be determined by something as arbitrary as the “timing”
87
of Proposition 8’s passage. Proposition 8 merely sought to restore the
traditional definition of marriage, and thus, the Court should not
80. Brief of Petitioners at 15–18, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2013).
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id. at 27–31.
83. Id. at 63.
84. Id. (“Providing special recognition to one class of individuals does not demean others
who are not similarly situated with respect to the central purpose of the recognition.”).
85. Id. at 22.
86. Id. at 19 (citing Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982)).
87. Id.
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privilege the 142 days in which same-sex couples were allowed to
88
marry over the long history of the traditional definition.
Having challenged the logic of the opinion below, Petitioners
focus on three state interests furthered by Proposition 8: responsible
procreation, proceeding with caution, and democratic self-governance.
Petitioners claim the relationship between marriage and procreation
undergirds society’s, as well as the Court’s, recognition of marriage as
89
a vital institution and a fundamental right. They decry the
transformation of marriage “from a public institution with wellestablished, venerable purposes focused on children into a private,
90
self-defined relationship focused on adults” that would ensue if
same-sex couples were granted access to “marriage.” Petitioners also
contend that Proposition 8’s relation to this vital interest is not
undermined by the fact that under California law, same-sex partners
are allowed to enter into civil unions and to parent children because it
is the label of “marriage” imbued with social meaning that functions
91
as the incentive. They argue reserving the word “marriage”
exclusively for heterosexual couples is sufficient to further this
interest: because it “provide[s] special recognition, encouragement,
and support to those relationships most likely to further society’s vital
92
interests in responsible procreation and childrearing.” Allowing
same-sex couples access to the label “marriage” would fundamentally
change what “marriage” signifies, and this change in social meaning
would undermine its function as an incentive for couples who
conceive a child out of wedlock to marry.
The final two state interests advocated by Petitioners are
93
“proceeding with caution,” and the California voters’ interest in
94
democratic self-governance. They argue “proceeding with caution
before fundamentally redefining a bedrock social institution” is
necessary to avoid unforeseen social consequences or social backlash.
Changing the institution of marriage to include same-sex couples
without broad-based democratic support “could weaken that
institution, which has traditionally drawn much of its strength not
88. Id. at 25.
89. See id. at 31–35 (citing some unlikely sources, from Claude Levi-Strauss to Bertrand
Russell to bolster this claim).
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id. at 44–48.
92. Id. at 45.
93. Id. at 48–55.
94. Id. at 55–61.
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from the State, but from social norms derived from and sustained by
95
public opinion.”
Regarding democratic self-governance, Petitioners’ narrative is
this: The California voters addressed the issue of gay marriage
democratically (resulting in the passage of Proposition 22), then the
court intervened and imposed its views in the In re Marriage Cases;
the people of California responded through the democratic process to
this judicial overreach by enacting Proposition 8. The passage of
Proposition 8 was democracy functioning as a check on the antimajoritarian courts.
B. Respondents’ Arguments
96

Respondents offer six substantive arguments: 1) Petitioners do
not have standing; 2) Proposition 8 should be subject to heightened
scrutiny on two independent grounds: a) under the Due Process
Clause because it creates unequal access to a fundamental right, and
b) under the Equal Protection Clause because Proposition 8
discriminates against gays and lesbians, a “suspect class”; 3)
Proposition 8 cannot survive even rational basis review; 4) the law is
not rationally related to the State’s interest in “responsible
procreation” because heterosexuals who are unwilling or unable to
procreate are still allowed to marry; 5) “proceeding with caution” and
the “interest in democratic self-governance” cannot function as
legitimate state interests under equal protection analysis because they
do not have limiting principles; and finally, 6) the anti-gay rhetoric of
the Proposition 8 campaign “leads inexorably” to the conclusion it
was enacted to make gays and lesbians feel unequal.
Like Petitioners, Respondents begin by addressing the question of
standing. They argue that the California Supreme Court’s decision
that Petitioners had standing on behalf of the State’s interest “does
not—and cannot—alter Petitioners’ inability to meet the ‘irreducible
constitutional minimum’ requirement of standing established by
97
Article III.” Petitioners must have a particularized interest in the
outcome of the case sufficient for third party standing and the “mere

95. Id. at 49–50.
96. I will use ‘Respondents’ to refer to the two same-sex couples who originally brought
suit.
97. Brief for Respondents at 16, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2013)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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98

desire to defend” is not a sufficient interest.
Unlike Petitioners, and unlike the holding in the Ninth Circuit,
Respondents cast the constitutional issue in very broad terms.
Respondents argue that Proposition 8 should be subject to
heightened scrutiny on two independent grounds: 1) because it
creates unequal access to a fundamental right, and 2) because gays
and lesbians constitute a minority historically subject to
99
discrimination and therefore should be treated as a “suspect class.”
Beginning with marriage as a fundamental right, Respondents assert
that they are not attempting to change the right (or to create a new
fundamental right to same-sex marriage) but merely want equal
access to a right the Court has repeatedly recognized as
100
fundamental.
Neither the institution itself, nor the Court’s
articulation of its value, has ever been limited to persons willing or
able to procreate; rather, “the decision of whom to marry is at the
101
core of individual autonomy and personal liberty.”
Respondents next argue that the Equal Protection Clause is
implicated because Proposition 8 denies gays and lesbians, as a class, a
right enjoyed by everyone else. Respondents further contend that a
heightened standard of review is appropriate because gays and
lesbians constitute a suspect class under the factors established by the
Court: a history of discrimination, immutability of the defining
characteristic, relative political powerlessness, and lack of a
relationship between the characteristic and one’s ability to contribute
102
to society.
Even if the Court applies rational basis review, Proposition 8
cannot stand because excluding gays and lesbians from “marriage” is
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Respondents argue
that the establishment of marriage as a legal institution may have
furthered the Petitioners’ proffered state interest in responsible
98. Id. at 13.
99. Respondents highlight a number of government forms of discrimination, including
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the recently repealed government policy prohibiting gays and lesbians
from serving openly in the military. They also highlight a number of private forms of
discrimination, including the fact that twenty-nine States still allow employment dismissal or
denial of housing based on sexual orientation. They assert that like the other suspect
classifications recognized under equal protection jurisprudence, sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic that bears no relationship to one’s ability to contribute to society. Id. at
28–36.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id. at 14–15.
102. Id. at 28–29.
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procreation and childrearing, but that this interest is not advanced by
the exclusion of gays and lesbians from that institution. Respondents
also point out that Petitioners do not even argue that prohibiting
same-sex couples the right to marry will make it more likely that
103
opposite-sex couples will marry. Furthermore, procreation cannot
be the primary rationale for marriage because heterosexual couples
104
unwilling or unable to procreate are still allowed to marry.
Next, Respondents argue that the characterization of “proceeding
with caution” as a state interest contains a vicious circularity: “[I]f
[Petitioners] are correct that an unsubstantiated fear of negative
externalities of equality is sufficient to justify inequality, then
105
discrimination is self-justifying.” Further, this argument, like the
interest in democratic self-governance argument, has no limiting
principle. Taken to their logical conclusions, both of these purported
interests by definition could be used to eclipse the protections
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment; yet, “the judiciary’s role
under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect discrete and insular
minorities from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, not to yield to
106
the majority’s preference.”
Finally, the absence of any rational basis combined with the antigay rhetoric used in the campaign “leads inexorably to the
conclusion” that Proposition 8 was enacted with the sole purpose of
107
making homosexuals “unequal to everyone else.” To bolster this
claim, Respondents cite literature from the Proposition 8 campaign
that cautions against the “danger” that if same-sex marriage is
permitted, society might come to view homosexual relationships as
108
“just as good” as heterosexual relationships.

103. Id. at 40.
104. Id. at 41.
105. Id. at 47.
106. Id. at 50 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 52.
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VI. ANALYSIS
A. Standing in the Way
The standing question is not an easy one because the Court’s
precedents on delegation of a State’s Article III standing appear to
109
point in opposite directions. Arizonans for Official English appears
to indicate that without an express grant of authority, safeguarding
the ballot initiative system is not sufficient grounding for standing.
However, the Court’s holding in Karcher suggests a textual basis is
110
not always required for delegation of State’s Article III standing.
As much as supporters of gay marriage would like to see the
111
Court reach the merits, the standing issues are not insignificant. In
Perry, if the Justices were looking for a reason to find a standing
problem, they would not have to look far. The California Supreme
Court’s holding that California law allows for proponents of
initiatives to represent the State’s interest was not grounded in the
text of a statute or any provision of the California State
112
Constitution. The holding was based instead on a history of
initiative proponents’ participation in state court litigation on behalf
of the State’s interests and a functionalist argument about
“safeguard[ing] the unique elements and integrity of the initiative
113
process.” Dicta in Arizonans for Official English casts at least some
doubt on whether the Court will accept the functionalist rationale
underlying the California Supreme Court’s conclusion because the
Court expressed “grave doubts” about proponents standing absent an
114
express delegation of the State’s interest. Petitioners are private
109. For a full discussion of the standing precedents in Perry, see generally Marty
Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage
Cases (VI), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Understanding Standing VI],
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-the-courts-article-iii-questions-inthe-same-sex-marriage-cases-vi/.
110. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (concluding the two legislators had standing
under New Jersey state law to intervene, despite citing no textual basis for this conclusion).
111. See generally Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III
Questions in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases (I), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2013) [hereinafter
Understanding Standing I], http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/01/understanding-standing-thecourts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-i/ (noting that the Court has been
“unusually attuned to some fundamental and vexing issues of Article III standing”).
112. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (citing Perry v. Brown, 52
Cal. 4th 1116, 1151–52 (Cal. 2011)).
113. Id.
114. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997) (refusing to
resolve whether a plaintiff that cannot show express delegation would have standing).
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individuals, not elected, and thus are not subject to the democratic
checks or ethical standards of public officials; there is no indication
why or in what manner Petitioners could be said to be agents of The
115
People of California. Furthermore, Petitioners’ original petition for
intervention did not seek to intervene on behalf of the State’s interest,
116
but instead on behalf of their personal and particularized interests.
Although neither of these standing issues is insurmountable, what
seems like a mere hurdle in getting to the merits may appear more
117
consequential down the road.
If the Court were to hold that the Petitioners lack standing, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision would also be vacated. The district court’s
holding, however, would be preserved and give rise to a subsequent
controversy over whether the district court judge, in issuing an
injunction that extended beyond the two couples, exceeded his
118
remedial power. It is unclear, however, who could appeal the scope
119
of the injunction.
If a majority of the Justices want to hear the case, however, the
Court will likely find standing despite these issues. In recent years, the
120
Court has tried to ensure that important cases are heard.
Furthermore, the initiative process argument, even if functionalist in
nature, is highly logical. The initiative process creates laws that the
legislature is not allowed to repeal or amend; denying proponents the
right to defend the laws passed through this process would allow the
executive and legislative branches to achieve what they could not do
directly (repeal the statute) through the courts (by refusing to defend
its validity). In addition, there was not an explicit textual basis in
115. Brief of Att’y Gen. of Cal. Kamala D. Harris as Amicus Curiae at 10–12, Perry v.
Brown, No.10-16696 (May 2, 2011). See also Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 65
(expressing in dicta concerns that the proponents of an initiative are neither elected
representatives nor agents of the people).
116. Understanding Standing VI, supra note 109.
117. See id. (discussing the potential problems if initiative proponents are allowed to
represent the State’s interest, including: proponents’ lack of accountability or concern for how
the litigation might impact the state financially or might impact other laws, the possibility of
division among the proponents about whether to appeal, and lack of political accountability).
118. Marty Lederman, The Court’s Five Options in the California Marriage Case,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2013,), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/the-courts-five-options-inthe-california-marriage-case/.
119. Id.
120. See Understanding Standing I, supra note 111 (discussing the Court’s recent standing
decision in Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) as “[possibly reflecting] a willingness on
the part of at least some Justices to temper their usually strict Article III jurisprudence to ensure
that the Court itself has an opportunity to weigh in on certain important constitutional
questions”).
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Karcher for allowing the intervention by state legislators on the
State’s behalf, and yet the Court found that New Jersey law gave them
standing. And finally, at least as formulated below, the form of Article
III standing at issue is in reference to representation of the State’s
interest and therefore deference to the state supreme court is
warranted. Thus, despite these inconsistencies, due to the salience of
the case combined with the logic of Petitioners’ argument regarding
the preservation of California’s popular referendum, the Court will
likely find standing.
B. Standard of Review
If recent jurisprudence is any indication, considering that Justice
Kennedy is likely to write the opinion, it seems unlikely that the
Court will announce a higher standard of review, even if it employs a
121
heightened form of rational basis review. In both Romer and
Lawrence, although apparently employing a form of heightened
rational basis review, Justice Kennedy declined to articulate a new
122
standard.
Part of the reason the Court has never explicitly announced a
heightened standard may be that gays and lesbians do not fit neatly
123
within the equal protection “suspect class” criteria. For instance,
although there is clearly a history of discrimination, questions remain
124
whether they are a politically powerless class. It was precisely this
121. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Court’s Gay-Marriage Confusion, THE NEW YORKER (Mar.
27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/03/supreme-court-prop-8toobin-kennedy.html (commenting that “as usual, it’s probably all up to Justice Anthony
Kennedy,” the well-known swing vote on the Court). Toobin’s assumption, echoed by many,
that the outcome and the opinion will be in the hands of Justice Kennedy, is based on the idea
that the four liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) will all find Proposition
8 unconstitutional, whereas the four conservative Justices (Scalia, Roberts, Alito, Thomas) will
find it to be within California’s police power.
122. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
majority opinion as “apply[ing] an unheard-of form of rational-basis review”); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (stating that Amendment 2 defies traditional judicial review).
123. This debate has evolved. Originally, it was based in a distinction between action and
identity (and framed as a debate about whether sexual orientation could be considered under
equal protection or whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was only
cognizable under the Due Process Clause). However, the Court in recent years has declined to
recognize this distinction between conduct and identity as applied to gays and lesbians. See
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010) (stating explicitly that the Court
does not recognize this distinction); Romer, 517 U.S at 633 (moving away from conduct-based
distinctions, and recognizing gays and lesbians as a cognizable class of citizens).
124. “Footnote Four” famously grounded the need for a heightened standard of review in
the inability of certain insular minorities to take advantage of traditional political channels. It
reads: “[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
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issue of political powerlessness that Justice Scalia took up in his
Romer dissent, calling it “nothing short of preposterous” to label gays
and lesbians a politically unpopular class because they enjoy
125
“enormous influence in American media and politics.” The recent
and rapidly evolving support for same-sex marriage, as well as the
Obama administration’s historic intervention on Respondents’ behalf,
126
lends at least some credence to Scalia’s argument.
Perhaps
anticipating this interpretation of the Administration’s intervention,
the Solicitor General’s brief directly addresses this argument against
127
granting heightened scrutiny, arguing that despite recent political
progress, gays and lesbians still constitute a disfavored minority
128
subject to unjustified targeting in the democratic process.
The Court is even more unlikely to apply heightened scrutiny
based on Proposition 8’s implication of the fundamental right to
marriage because such a holding would possibly indicate a fifty-state
solution; it would overturn laws in more than forty states, which, as
discussed below, would violate the principle of judicial minimalism
129
and trigger concerns about the legitimacy of the Court. That said,
the Court’s refusal to articulate a new standard of review does not
mean the Court will exercise the highest degree of deference in its
analysis or fail to weigh the importance of marriage as a fundamental
right.

tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See
generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
125. Romer, 517 U.S at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In this discussion, Scalia cites as evidence
of homosexuals’ political power that despite composing only 4% of the Colorado electorate,
they managed to “get” 47% percent of the electorate to vote against Amendment 2.
126. For a comprehensive discussion of the poll numbers and this perceived political shift,
see generally Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What It Means,
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013) http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/howopinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/.
127. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (Feb. 28, 2013).
128. Id. at 9.
129. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (highlighting two “cardinal
rules” of the federal courts: “never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it,” and “never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S.
Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).

FORMATTED COMMENTARY (DO NOT DELETE)

238

5/11/2013 10:53 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8

C. Narrow Holding
If the Court reaches the merits, it seems unlikely the Court will
130
overturn the Ninth Circuit’s narrow holding. It appears equally
unlikely, however, that the Court will offer a complete endorsement
or a national imposition of same-sex marriage. Instead, the Court will
reach a decision that implicates only California or one that affects
California and the other seven states that have granted civil unions
with full substantive rights to gays and lesbians. Either holding would
circumscribe the harm as denial of the access to the label “marriage.”
Even under rational basis review, the Court is unlikely to be
swayed by interests offered by Petitioners. Petitioners’ central
argument that the primary purpose of marriage is to promote
responsible procreation and childrearing is contrary to the Court’s
articulation of marriage as a fundamental right. At the same time, the
Court will be more sympathetic to the other two interests,
“proceeding with caution “and “respect for the democratic process.”
However, these principles should not stand as legitimate state
interests under rational basis review because equal protection comes
into play precisely when legislation has been democratically passed
yet discriminates against an insular minority. Therefore, overturning
discriminatory legislation is always both anti-majoritarian and
disruptive of the status quo.
The image of marriage that Petitioners argue is in the State’s
interest to preserve runs contrary to the Court’s depiction of marriage
as a fundamental right and as a sacred bond between adults.
Petitioners decry the transformation of marriage “from a public
institution with well-established, venerable purposes focused on
children into a private, self-defined relationship focused on adults”
131
that would result from recognizing same-sex marriage.
This
approach is misguided because “a private, self-defined relationship
focused on adults” is wholly commensurate with the Court’s recent
opinions on marriage. Loving characterized the institution of
marriage as “a deeply public and private symbol that carries profound
consequences touching on individual self-understanding and social
132
mores.” In other cases, the Court has described marriage as a
130. Ironically, even Justice Scalia, in his vehement dissent in Lawrence, acknowledged that
the majority’s logic would jeopardize laws banning same-sex marriage. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 588, 600 (2003).
131. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 53.
132. Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
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134

privacy right, a right of association, and a liberty right “of
135
fundamental importance to all individuals.” These articulations cast
marriage as part of defining one’s own identity rather than simply
serving the purpose of childrearing. In particular, Justice Kennedy,
136
again the one likely to be writing for the Court, has articulated the
choice of one’s partner as part of the way individuals constitute their
137
identity. The Court therefore is unlikely to endorse a view of
marriage as necessarily, or even primarily, related to childrearing.
Furthermore, Petitioners’ assert the primacy of the childrearing
aspect of marriage without addressing the obvious critique that
heterosexual couples who are incapable of procreating (and therefore
not furthering this interest) are allowed to marry.
Unswayed by the procreation argument, the Court will likely be
more sympathetic to Petitioners’ “proceeding with caution” and
“democratic process” arguments. Although not cognizable as
138
rationally-related state interests, Petitioners’ final two arguments
will influence the Court’s decision and will limit the expansiveness of
its holding. In light of federalist and institutional concerns, the Court
will not hold denial of same-sex marriage to violate equal protection
more generally. The likely outcome is either an affirmation of the
139
Ninth Circuit’s logic grounded in Romer or the eight-state solution.
Either holding could appeal to those concerned about the Court’s
legitimacy and matters of institutional competency, and serve as an
intermediate stepping stone toward inevitable marriage equality. The
Ninth’s Circuit’s holding would be limited to California. The eightMarriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 488.
133. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing marital privacy as “a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our
school system . . . and intimate to the degree of being sacred”).
134. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (“Choices about marriage, family life, and
the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic
importance in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s
unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added).
136. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
137. In Lawrence, Kennedy wrote that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage . . . [and] family relationships” because of
“the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these
choices.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 22 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
574 (2003)).
138. Although these arguments draw on judicial concerns the Court weighs when
considering constitutional rights claims, they cannot be considered under the rational basis test
because neither has a limiting principle.
139. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
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state solution would hold that those states that already grant all the
substantive rights of marriage to gays and lesbians through civil
unions cannot constitutionally withhold the label “marriage” from
140
those unions. At oral argument, the Justices seemed wary of the
Solicitor General’s advocacy of the eight-state solution and skeptical
141
that its reasoning had such cognizable limits.
D. Expressive Harm
Perry is, at its core, a case about the power of government speech
to convey normative judgments. Expressive harm refers to the
negative social meaning or inferior status a law attaches to a
particular group. On expressive harm grounds, the Court would be
justified in holding that Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has never held that
expressive harm alone can violate equal protection; therefore holding
as such could be characterized as a radical break with past
jurisprudence. At the same time, such a holding would be completely
commensurate with the Court’s “animus analysis” and would not
actually represent a departure from past jurisprudence.
1. Perry is a Case About Social Meaning and Expressive Harm
Approaches to law that focus on the meaning conveyed or
produced by the State’s actions are termed “expressive theories of
142
law.” Expressive theories of law begin with the baseline assertion
that a State’s actions convey meaning and express a point of view. The
meaning a given law expresses is not solely determined by the
intentions of those who enacted it, but also by how it fits within the
landscape of norms and practices more generally (and is therefore

140. See Brief for the United States, supra note 127, at 33 (“California’s extension of all of
the substantive rights and responsibilities of marriage to gay and lesbian domestic partners
particularly undermines the justifications for Proposition 8.”).
141. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S.
argued Mar. 26, 2013) (Kennedy, J.) (questioning the rationale of essentially “penalizing”
California and those state that “ha[d] been more generous, more open to protecting same-sex
couples”). Justice Alito also expressed incredulity that the eight-state solution was based on
legally cognizable distinction: “[A]re you seriously arguing that . . . if the case before us now
were from a State that doesn’t provide any of those benefits to same-sex couples, this case
would come out differently?” Id. at 43. Even the liberal justices expressed reservations about
the eight-state solution. For instance, Justice Sotomayor highlighted its logical inconsistency,
remarking, “there is an irony in [the eight-state solution], which is the States that do more have
less rights.” Id. at 54–55.
142. Adler, supra note 9, at 1364.
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143

defined by its “social meaning”). Accordingly, the State has an
obligation to ensure that its actions express equal respect and concern
144
for all of its citizens. State actions that fail to do so, even without
material consequences or malicious intent, are legally cognizable as
145
state-imposed harms, known as “expressive harms.” In essence,
expressive harms are state actions that confer second-class status onto
146
a particular group.
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts framed the issue as the
struggle over the meaning of a word:
[I]f you tell a child that somebody has to be their friend, I suppose
you can force the child to say, this is my friend, but it changes the
definition of what it means to be a friend. And that’s it seems [sic]
to me what the . . . supporters of Proposition 8 are saying here. . . .
[A]ll you’re interested in is the label and you insist on changing the
147
definition of the label.

In fact, both Petitioners and Respondents in Perry agree that this
case is about the government’s role in producing the social meaning
of this “label,” and both argue their case in expressive terms. The
difference is that Respondents do not believe that granting same-sex
couples access to the label “marriage” would diminish its value or
status, just as the meaning of “marriage” did not change when
148
interracial couples were granted the right to marry. In contrast,
Petitioners, like the Chief Justice, think that the struggle is over
preserving the current meaning of the word, which would necessarily
149
change if same-sex “marriage” were recognized. Nonetheless, the
143. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1525 (“These meanings are a result of the ways in which
actions fit with . . . other meaningful norms and practices in the community. Although these
meanings do not actually have to be recognized by the community, they have to be recognizable
by it, if people were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.”).
144. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1,
2 (2000).
145. Id.
146. See generally Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordination and Equal
Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 112 (2012). An expressive approach to equal protection is
not equivalent to, and should not be conflated with, the “colorblind” approach. Both the
colorblind and the anti-caste approaches to equal protection incorporate expressive elements.
The difference between the two approaches hinges on which categorizations convey secondclass citizenship. See Hellman, supra note 144, at 16–17.
147. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 44–45.
148. Brief for Respondents, supra note 97, at 26.
149. Petitioners explicitly recognize the State’s role in the production of social meaning,
arguing that “it matters what California or the United States calls marriage, because this affects
how Californians or Americans come to think of marriage.” Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80,
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battleground on which this case is being waged from all sides is
150
undeniably an expressive one.
Respondents argue that withholding the label of “marriage”
151
constitutes a state-imposed harm. Civil unions function as “badge[s]
152
of inferiority, separateness, and inequality,” even though they have
the same substantive rights as marriage, they argue, because denial of
the label “marriage” is a declaration “[w]ith the full authority of the
State behind it” that gays and lesbians are not good enough to
153
marry.
The strongest argument in favor of a cognizable harm in Perry is
one that proceeds by analogy and has been made by many
154
commentators on the issue. The analogy goes as follows: Imagine in
the wake of Loving, Virginia immediately passed a law granting
interracial couples all of the substantive rights and obligations of
marriage but terming their civil arrangement something else, such as
“interracial union.” If it were true that denying same-sex couples
access to the label “marriage” does not convey second-class
citizenship and constitute a state-imposed harm, it would have to also
be true that the denial of the label to interracial couples would not
155
constitute a state-imposed harm. When placed in this context, it is
hard to contend that denial of the label “marriage” conveys anything
other than second-class citizenship.

at 50–51 (quoting ROBERT P. GEORGE ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN AND WOMAN: A
DEFENSE 54 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. In addition to the parties’ arguments and the Justices’ questions, the Solicitor
General’s brief also foregrounds the expressive stakes of the issue in Perry by advocating the
“eight-state solution,” which focuses on the isolation of the term from the substantive rights of
marriage (that is what distinguishes the eight states from the others).
151. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 53–54 (“[W]ithholding it causes infinite and
permanent stigma, pain, and isolation. It denies gay men and lesbians their identity and their
dignity; it labels their families as second-rate.”).
152. Id. at 54.
153. Id. at 28.
154. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 9, at 1272; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry
Decision and the Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 96
(Feb. 22, 2012); Tribe & Matz, supra note 132, at 486. David Boies also made this analogy at
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 141, at 45.
155. Dorf, supra note 9, at 1272.
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2. Is Expressive Harm Alone Enough to Constitute an Equal
Protection Violation?
The first question is whether expressive harm is sufficient to
156
violate the Equal Protection Clause. Palmer v. Thompson appears to
indicate that purely expressive harm is not enough. In Palmer, the
closing of a community pool in the face of an order to desegregate,
despite its clear discriminatory intent and message, was “an
157
unsuccessful attempt to violate the Constitution.” This holding seems
relatively damning to Respondent’s case because it indicates that
isolated expressive harm is not legally cognizable as state-imposed
harm.
However, as Michael Dorf rightly points out, the analogy between
Palmer and the same-sex marriage context is not a neat one, and it in
158
fact may be misleading. The proper analogy between Perry and
Palmer would be if the state of California, in the wake of the In re
Marriage Cases, had ended “marriage” as an institution, making it
159
unavailable to both heterosexual and same-sex couples. Palmer
holds that even open animosity is not enough if the law affects all
160
members with at least formal equality, but its holding does not
preclude expressive harm from being sufficient when, like in Perry, it
is coupled with facially discriminatory treatment of a vulnerable
group.
3. How to Measure Expressive Harm: Intention or Impact?
Even if one concedes expressive harm could be sufficient to
trigger Fourteenth Amendment protections, the question of how to
measure expressive harm remains. The two mechanisms by which
expressive harm could be measured, both with long histories in equal
161
162
protection analysis, are “intention” and “impact.” In general, equal
156. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
157. Dorf, supra note 9, at 1273 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private
and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crimes and Animal Sacrifice, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23).
158. Id. at 1274.
159. Id.
160. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25 (holding that closing the swimming pool to avoid
desegregation did not formally treat blacks differently from whites, and that “no case in this
Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the
motivations of the men who voted for it”).
161. The intent-based approach to equal protection asserts that discriminatory intent
should be the primary measure for invalidating laws under the Equal Protection Clause.
Hellman, supra note 145, at 1–2.
162. The impact-based approach to equal protection asserts that discriminatory effects,
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protection analysis tends to privilege discriminatory intent over
163
disparate impact.
The Court’s formulation of “animus,” however, seems to constitute
164
a third approach, which borrows elements from both “intent” and
“impact” and yet is more commensurate with expressive harm or
social meaning analysis. Animus analysis adopts intention analysis’s
focus on the content of the message as opposed to its material
consequences. However, animus analysis adopts impact analysis’s
objective approach rather than a subjective approach. For example, in
Romer, the Court in finding animus did not conclude that the
Colorado voters had hatred in their hearts; instead, it found that from
an objective perspective, the amendment lacked any relation to a
state interest and could only be understood to establish gays and
165
lesbians as unequal to everyone else. Animus analysis appears to
embody a move to a more objective approach to meaning, and thus
one closer to social meaning. The analysis therefore becomes not
about whether the voters harbored ill will or hostility, but whether the
message conveyed could be understood as conveying second-class
citizenship. This leads inevitably to the question of whether depriving
the label of “marriage” is connotative of second-class citizenship. The
analogy to Loving certainly seems to provide the basis for such a
conclusion.
By either affirming the Ninth Circuit’s logic or electing the eightstate solution, the Court would in essence hold that a merely
expressive harm violates the guarantee of equal protection. Although
this would be in some ways a narrow holding (applying to only one or
eight states, respectively), it would not be a conservative one. Many
have argued that recognition of expressive harm is implicit in
jurisprudence of the formalist and functionalist members of the Court
166
alike, but expressive harm has never been isolated in an equal
protection case the way it is in Perry. A holding based on expressive
oftentimes referred to as “disparate impact,” should be the primary measure for invalidating
laws under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
163. See id. (discussing the dominance of the intent-based approach to equal protection
analysis and its historical ascendancy in the wake of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976),
the case in which the Court first articulated that disparate impact was not sufficient to establish
a prima facie violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
164. See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text.
165. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
166. Dorf, supra note 9, at 1286 (arguing that there is “a cross-ideological consensus that
social meaning alone can be the basis for limiting government speech and action when the social
meaning expressed is second-class citizenship”).

FORMATTED COMMENTARY (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/11/2013 10:53 AM

PERRY: EXPRESSIVE HARM AND THE STAKES OF “MARRIAGE”

245

harm would be both completely in line with the Court’s articulation of
animus analysis and a somewhat radical step forward in the Court’s
167
recognition of the importance of social meaning.
Although the Court will adjudicate Perry in terms of the right to
168
the word “marriage,” its pairing with Windsor may in fact make the
expressive harm reasoning more palatable to the Court insofar as it
illustrates the degree to which the expressive and material are never
wholly separate in the law. Windsor could impact the stakes of Perry
ex post by changing the significance of state recognition. If the Court
strikes down DOMA, holding that the government has to allocate
federal marriage benefits to all couples legally married under their
state’s laws, then how California defines “marriage” will determine
whether same-sex couples in California have access to federal
marriage benefits. Depending on how Windsor comes out, access to
the word “marriage” could be the deciding line between receiving and
not receiving federal marriage benefits—reminding the Court that
government speech always has consequences.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the current political climate, it is hard to believe that the Court
held the criminalization of homosexual conduct unconstitutional less
than ten years ago. And the pace of progress on this issue is only
accelerating. Within one year of President Obama’s first public
acknowledgement of narrowly circumscribed support, he offered a
full-throated endorsement of marriage equality in his Inauguration
169
Speech. Republicans who campaigned against same-sex marriage in
the last election less than a year ago joined the administration among
the amici curiae in support of Respondents. Despite this rapid
evolution—or perhaps because of it—the Court is likely to either

167. It would admittedly be ironic that disparate impact could only be cognizable under
strict scrutiny but expressive harm could violate even (heightened) rational basis. However, it is
very hard to imagine that expressive harm when paired with material harm would be any easier
to justify under equal protection analysis.
168. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. argued Mar. 27, 2013) (addressing whether
the Defense of Marriage Act’s denial of federal marriage benefits to same-sex couples legally
married under the laws of their state violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection).
169. “Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like anyone
else under the law, for if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to one
another must be equal, as well.” President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-presidentbarack-obama.
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avoid the issue or offer a narrow holding in Perry. At this rate of
political progress, however, playing it too safe could leave the Justices
on the wrong side of history more quickly than they expect.

